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1 Introduction 
There are famously two main alternative metaphysics of persistence, namely Three and Four-
Dimensionalism.1 3D, or endurantism, roughly maintains that material objects are three-dimensional 
wholes that are multi-located at different temporally unextended regions of spacetime and persist through 
time by being wholly present at each time of their existence. 4D, or perdurantism, maintains roughly that 
material objects are four-dimensional wholes that are singly located at a temporally extended region of 
spacetime and persist through time by having a different temporal part at each time of their existence. 
Both  those metaphysics of persistence yield a particular solution to the so called puzzle of change. In this 
paper I argue that endurantist solutions to the puzzle face insurmountable difficulties when framed within 
the context of Minkowski spacetime.2 This result could be taken either to favor 4D or as a challenge for 
3D to give a new account of change in a relativistic setting. Here’s a plan of the paper. In section 2 I will 
sketch a formal theory of both  parthood and location using two primitive notions, that of parthood itself 
and that of exact location. This will lead to a rigorous formulation of controversial metaphysical thesis in 
section 3. In section 4 I will give an argument, which I label the Location Argument to show that, in a 
relativistic context, three-dimensional objects are exactly multi-located at different spacetime regions that 
typically overlap each other. In section 5 I will briefly rehearse the so called puzzle of change and the 
typical endurantist solutions to it. Then in section 6 I will present my main argument, which I label the 
Relativistic Argument from Change. The core of the Relativistic Argument from Change is that the three-
dimensionalist solutions presented in section 5fail, due to the fact that different exact locations of a three-
dimensional object overlap each other. This argument depends crucially on the geometric structure of 
Minkowski spacetime. In the concluding section I consider different ways to resist my argument and 
discuss them. 
2  Parthood and Location 
It is clear from the introduction that at least two different ways of formulating the disagreement between 
3D and 4D are possible. The first one is in terms of the location of material objects, the other one is in 
terms of their mereological structure.3 Attempts to define clearly the notion of temporal part have proved 
extremely difficult.4 The basic idea to make use of the notion of location to formulate precisely 
controversial metaphysical theories about persistence without appealing to the allegedly obscure notion of 
temporal part goes at least back to Van Inwagen (1990). The driving intuition behind this strategy is both 
simple and powerful. Suppose we can grasp an informal notion of exact location along these terms.5 An 
object x is exactly located at region R if it exactly fits into this region, i.e the object x and the region R 
have the same shape, size and so on. Thus for example a square region cannot be the exact location of a 
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  3D and 4D from now on respectively. 
2
  From now on I will take Minkowski spacetime to be an example of a metric affine space with signature (1, n-1), 
where n = 4. See Malament (2007) and Sartori (1996) for details. 
3
 The relationship between locational and mereological persistence are very interesting, yet they can not be 
explored here. See Gilmore (2007). 
4
 See Sider (2001) and reference therein. 
5
 See Gilmore (2007). 
circle or my office cannot be the exact location of Mount Everest. If we can grasp such a notion it seems 
that a vivid difference between 3D and 4D can be captured in those terms. Since three-dimensional 
objects and four-dimensional objects have different shapes and sizes they will have different regions as 
their exact locations. 
Now the problem at hand is to propose formal theories of location that try to regiment different  locational 
notions. The relation of exact location can be taken as primitive or defined via other sets of primitives. In 
what follows I will make use of just two primitive notions, the mereological notion of parthood and the 
locational notion of exact location. I will write 
(2.1) (Parthood) x < y  
(2.2) (Exact Location) ExL (x,R) 
That are read “x is part of y” and “x is exactly located at region R” respectively. From (2.1) is possible to 
define6 further mereological notions such as proper parthood and overlap via 
(2.3) (Proper Parthood)7  x << y = df x < y ∧ x ≠ y 
(2.4) (Overlap) O (x,y) = df (∃z) (z < x ∧ z < y) 
Informally two things overlap if they share a part. We regiment these notions with these axioms 
(2.5) (Reflexivity) x < x 
(2.6) (Antisymmetry) (x < y ∧ y < x) → x = y 
(2.7) (Transitivity) x < y ∧ y < z → x < z 
(2.8) (Weak Supplementation) x << y → (∃z) (z << y ∧ ∼ O (x,z)) 
The mereological theory comprising axioms (2.5) – (2.8) is known as Minimal Mereology.8 It will do 
double duty as a theory of parthood both for material objects and spacetime regions. It is now possible to 
define the locative notions of weak location, overfilling and underfilling, as 
(2.9) (Weak Location) WL (x,R) = df (∃R1) (ExL (x,R1) ∧ O (R,R1)  
(2.10) (Overfilling) OvF (x, R) = df (∃R1) (ExL (x,R1) ∧ R < R1) 
(2.11) (Underfilling) UnF (x,R) = df (∃R1) (ExL (x,R1) ∧ R1 < R) 
Gilmore (2007) proposes different constraints to regiment such notions: 
(2.12) Suppose ExL(x,R) holds. Then x has the same geometrical properties of R and stands in 
the same geometrical relations as  R 
Gilmore calls Bifurcation the thesis according to which the shapes of material objects can be reduced to 
the shapes of spacetime regions via the schema “ x has shape S = x is exactly located at an S-shaped 
speactime region”. Condition (2.12) is the denial of the Bifurcation thesis.  
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  First order logic with identity is presupposed, thought identity could be introduced by definition. Formulas, unless 
otherwise noted are to be taken as universally closed. 
7
  Another definition is found in literature, namely x is a proper part of y = x is part of y and y is not part of x. Given 
anti-symmetry it turns out that the definitions are equivalent. 
8
  See Simons (1987) and Varzi (2009) for details.  
(2.13) It is not impossible for an object x to be exactly multi-located, to be exactly located at two 
different, even non overlapping, regions R1 and R2 
This condition simply says that multi-location is possible.9 
(2.14) Suppose the following hold: ExL(x,R1), ExL(x,R2) and R1 ≠  R2. Then it does not follow 
that ExL(x, R1 ∪ R2)10 
Condition (2.14) informally says that a multi-located object can fail to be exactly located at the union of 
its exact locations. This should not come as a surprise. It in fact fallows straightforwardly from (2.12). 
Suppose x is exactly multi-located at two different spherical regions. Then the sum of those regions is 
itself not spherical and x cannot possibly be exactly located there. 
(2.15) Suppose ExL(x,R) holds. Then it is possible that x, even if when mereologically  simple, 
fails to be exactly located at any other region R1 that is distinct from R, in particular at any 
subregion of R 
The argument for (2.15) parallel the one in favor of (2.14). And, finally 
(2.16) Suppose the following hold. ExL(x,R1), ExL(x,R2) and R1 ≠ R2. Then it is possible for x to 
have a different mereological composition at R1 and R2  
Condition (2.16) is supposed to capture the very strong pre-analytical intuition that a certain thing can 
gain and lose parts while remaining identical to itself. It is worth noting that this condition has been 
challenged by the advocates of the so called mereological essentialism, most notably Chisolm (1973). 
The one I just sketched out can be considered a multi-location theory of location. With this in hand it is 
possible to give a rigorous formulation of the controversial metaphysical thesis of 3D and 4D. I now turn 
on to such a formulation. 
3  Metaphysics of Persistence in Minkowski Spacetime 
Recall the pre-analytical intuitions we are supposed to vindicate. A three-dimensional object is a 
persisting object that is multiply located at different temporally unextended spacetime regions while a 
four-dimensional object is a persisting object that is singly located at a temporally extended one.  Thus, it 
seems that we do need some formal counterparts for such informal notions as persisting object and 
temporal extension. Let's start from the latter.11 Suppose a proper subregion R of Minkwoski spacetime 
contains two distinct points p, q such that the vector pq12 is a future directed causal13 vector. Then an 
event e (q) located14 at q will always be later than an event e (p) located at p. Hence the subregion R 
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  This is the condition Barker and Dowe (2003) explicitly denies. See also Parsons (2006). 
10
  The set-theoretic notion of union is used here and in other places  instead of the notion of mereological sum. This 
is just for sake of clarity. The reader is probably more familiar with the set theoretical notion. However 
everywhere in the arguments it could be replaced by the notion of sum or fusion defined only in terms of the 
mereological notions introduced.  
11 This construction is specific for relativistic spacetimes. In fact the notion of temporal precedence can be grounded 
in the mathematical structure of inner product for such spacetimes. If spacetime is Newtonian you will have to 
take as primitive the notion of absolute precedence and then go define the notion of an achronal region via that 
notion. 
12 As a conventional device vectors are written in bold characters. 
13
  A vector is causal if it is either timlike or null like.  
14 There is no need to be formal here. 
should count as temporally extended. This suggests an elegant definition of an achronal region grounded 
in the metrical structure of Minkowski spacetime15  
(3.1) (Achronal) Achr (R) =
 df (∀p) (∀q) (p∈R ∧ q∈R) → <pq, pq> < 0 
An achronal region is a region such that every two points in it are connected by a spacelike vector. 
Objects persist trough time. That much seems uncontroversial. The controversy is about how they do so. 
Lewis (1986) defines the uncontroversial notion of persisting object along the following lines. A 
persisting object is an object that exists at two different times, no matter how it does so. To give a 
rigorous formulation let me introduce the definition of a path of an object. The path of an object 
comprises its entire spatiotemporal career: 
(3.2) (Path) Path (x) = df  ∪i (Ri) ExL (x,Ri)16 
Thus, the path of an object is just the union of its exact locations. If x is singly located, for example at R, 
we will simply have Path (x) = R. A persisting object is then an object such that its path is not achronal: 
(3.3) (Persisting) Pers (x) = df ∼ Achr (Path (x)) 
Next we define a three-dimensional object via 
(3.4) (Three-Dimensional Object) 3D (x) = df Pers (x) ∧ (∀R) (ExL (x,R) → Achr (R)) 
There are several things to note about definition (3.4). First of all the definition informally says that a 
three-dimensional object is a persisting object that is exactly located at spacetime subregions that are 
achronal, i.e. allegedly temporally unextended. This was however just one part of those pre-analytical 
intuitions about three-dimensional objects we were supposed to capture. The other one was that three-
dimensional objects are multi-located. This worry can be set aside. It follows from (3.1) – (3.4) that a 
three-dimensional object is exactly multi-located: 
(3.5) 3D (x) → (∃R1) (∃R2) (R1 ≠ R2 ∧ ExL (x,R1) ∧ ExL (x,R2)) 
Proof. Suppose it does not hold. Then x is a 3D object but we have that  R1 = R2.  By definition of a 3D 
object it follows from this definition that R1 is achronal, i.e. Achr (R1) holds. Suppose for sake of 
argument that x is just located at R1 and R2. Then Path (x) = R1 ∪ R2 = R1 = R2. But then by the argument 
above from Achr (R1) follows Achr (Path (x)). Thus x does not qualify as a persisting object, and a-
fortiori, does not qualify as a 3D object. And this contradicts our assumption, so (3.5) holds.  
It moreover follows that the exact locations of an object are proper subregions of its path: 
(3.6) 3D (x) → (ExL (x, R) → R << Path (x)) 
Proof.  R < Path (x) follows by definition of Path (x) in (3.2). Then, from minimal mereology either R = 
Path (x) or R << Path (x). In the first case since x is a persisting object  ∼ Achr ( R ) will follow. But this 
will imply that x is not a 3D object according to definition (3.4) for R is supposed to be one of its exact 
locations. Then it has to be the second case, which is exactly what (3.6) claims. 
There is a crucial thing to note. From (3.4) and (3.6) we know that the exact locations of a 3D object x are 
achronal proper subregions of Path (x) but we do not know which achronal proper subregions of Path (x) 
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 If this notion of achronality vindicates our pre-analytical intuitions about temporal extension is an interesting 
question, but one that I will leave it aside. I will take it for granted that it could. Personally I am skeptical about it. 
Note however that this will cause problems only for three-dimensionalism.  
16
 The index i ranges over spacetime subregions. 
they are. In other words, (3.4) and (3.6) give us properties of those subregions but are not enough to 
single them out among many. The Location Argument in the next section is a tentative answer to such a 
problem.  
Given these results 3D is just the universal claim that all persisting material objects MO are three-
dimensional objects: 
(3.7) (Three-Dimensionalism) 3D = df MO (x) → (Pers (x) → 3D (x)) 
On the other hand four-dimensional objects are supposed to be singly exactly located at an unique 
temporally extended spacetime region. That region cannot but be Path(x), which suggests: 
(3.8) (Four-Dimensional Object) 4D (x) = df Pers (x)  ∧ ExL (x, Path (x)) 
And 
(3.9) (Four-Dimensionalism) 4D = df MO (x) → (Pers (x) → 4D (x)) 
All this gives us a rigorous formulation of controversial metaphysical thesis in the simplest relativistic 
setting. 
4  The Location Argument17 
As I have already pointed out in the previous section the definitions I have offered of three and four-
dimensional objects leave some important questions unanswered. In particular they leave unanswered 
what Gilmore (2007), following Smart (1972) and Rea (1998), calls the Location Question. Here is a 
formulation: 
(4.1) (Location Question). Let x be a persisting object. Which subregions of Path (x) is x exactly 
located at? 
It is precisely in answering this question that it is possible to appreciate a structural difference in the 
definitions of  three and four-dimensional objects. The first definition, that of a 3D object,  gives us only 
properties of the exact locations of an object, while the latter does not only give us properties of the 
unique exact location, but it is also able to single it out. As a consequence 4D has a straightforward and 
very simple answer to (4.1), namely: 
(4.2) (Path Principle) Let x be a 4D object. Then x is exactly located at Path (x) which is the only 
improper subregion of itself 
The Path principle follows trivially from definition (3.8). Things are different for three-dimensionalists. 
They will not be able to single out which proper subregions of Path (x) are to be counted as x’s exact 
locations simply by looking at the definition of a three-dimensional object. They need a substantive 
argument to answer the Location Question. Gilmore (2008) divides the possible three-dimensionalist 
answers into Overlap and No Overlap answers. Overlap answers hold that typically a 3D object x will be 
exactly located at different proper subregions of Path (x) that overlap each other. No Overlap answers 
deny such a claim. To discuss them I first need to introduce the notion of a foliation. A foliation F of a 
spacetime region R is a set of subregions of R such that i) each subregion R1 of R in F is achronal, ii)  each 
subregion in F is a maximal subregion, i.e. if R1 is in F than there is no achronal region R2 such that R1 << 
R2 and R and, iii) each point in R belongs to just one maximal achronal subregion Ri. It is now possible to 
consider different No Overlap answers. Probably the first that comes to mind is given by the Rest Frame 
Principle: 
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  My discussion here follows closely the excellent Gilmore (2007) which I consider the best paper on the subject. 
(4.3) (Rest Frame Principle) Let x be a  3D object. Then x exactly occupies only those 
subregions that are given by its rest frame foliation. Suppose for sake of simplicity that x is not 
accelerating. Then, given the geometry of Minkwoski spacetime it follows that x is exactly 
located just at those subregions of Path (x) that are orthogonal with Path (x) 
The main problem with the rest Frame Principle is that it will give raise to implausible consequences. 
Consider a spatially extended object18 x whose endpoints move along the timelike lines spanned by the 
timelike vector u. Then, given (4.3), the exact locations of x will be subregions of the spacelike 
submanifold orthogonal to u, usually indicated as u⊥. Now consider y, one of x’s spatially extended 
proper parts and suppose y is moving with a certain velocity v ≠ 0 with respect to x. Suppose its endpoints 
move along the timelike lines spanned by the timelike vector v such that v ≠ a u for any real number a. 
Then, given (4.3) again, the exact locations of y will be subregions of v⊥. But for any spacetime point p in 
Path (x) the subregion of u⊥ passing through p does not contain the subregions of  v⊥ passing through that 
point. This means that the exact locations of y will not be subregions of the exact locations of x. In other 
words y will be exactly located outside x, though it is one of its proper parts.  Here is another way to put 
the same point. The Rest Frame Principle entails that 3D objects constitute a counterexample to the very 
plausible locational principle of expansivity, according to which an object cannot fail to be located where 
its parts are. This seems enough to conclude that (4.3) is not an adequate answer to the Location Question 
in a relativistic setting.  
Then a three-dimensionalist might try: 
(4.4) (Top-Down Principle) Let x be a 3D object and let F be a physically preferred foliation of 
the entire Minkowski spacetime. Then x exactly occupies just those subregions of Path (x) that 
are given by the preferred foliation F 
This answer  is easily dispensed with in the context of Minkoski spacetime.19 Minkowski spacetime  
simply does not admit such a preferred foliation20, so the Top Down Principle is a non starter.  
The last plausible No Overlap answer is the Bottom Up Principle. Suppose we define a foliation F 
according to the following procedure. Take the first slice of Path (x). Identify the simple particles that 
compose x at that slice. Then attach a natural clock to each of those particles. Call a Particle Synchrony 
Slice a sum of those exact locations of each particle that compose x in which the natural clocks are  
synchronized, i.e. indicate the same number. A three-dimensionalist could go on to argue for: 
(4.5) (The Bottom Up Principle) Let x be a 3D object. Then it exactly occupies those regions that 
are given by the Particle Synchrony Slices of Path (x) 
The problem of this answer is that natural clocks, such as the ones attached to the particles composing x, 
read proper time in Minkowski spacetime. Let x be composed, for sake of simplicity, by two simple 
particles y and z. They move along timelike lines P and Q spanned by the timelike vectors u and v 
respectively such that u ≠ a v for any real number a. Suppose to indicate with p1…n and q1…n the points on 
P and Q respectively that are the exact locations of y and z. Then the First Particle Synchrony Slice of x 
will be given by p1 ∪ q1, the Second Particle Synchrony slice by p2 ∪ q2, and so on till  the n-th, given by 
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  The argument presupposes that both composite objects exist, and that they are spatially extended. 
19
 The issue of the tenability of the Top Down principle in general relativistic spacetime is more complex. Some 
general relativistic spacetimes seem to admit the possibility of a physically preferred foliation after all. However 
the principle will yield highly counterintuitive results when shapes of locational 3D objects are taken onto 
account. Moreover it will affect the modal status of three-dimensionalism. Since not every general relativistic 
spacetime admits such a foliation, it will follow that three-dimensionalsim is contingently true if true at all only 
for those models that admit such a preferred foliation. See Gilmore (2007) for a more detailed discussion.  
20
  It follows from the fact that given any timelike line L there is always an isometry of Minkowski spacetime that 
maps L into any other timelike line L1. 
pn ∪ qn. But as I have mentioned natural clocks read proper time. This means that the elapsed time 
between two spacetime points is just given by the length of the timelike vector that connects the two 
points. Since the natural clocks have to be synchronized we will have that |p1p2| = |q1q2|, |p1p3| = |q1q3| 
and so on till |p1pn| = |q1qn|. But here is the problem. Given this there is going to be a spacetime point m 
such that |p1pm| = |q1qm| and that pmqm is timelike. Now,  pm ∪ qm counts as a particle synchrony slice of 
x, and thus, according to (4.5), as an exact location of x. But this is not an achronal region and so, by 
definition of a three-dimensional object x could not possibly be exactly located there. It follows that also 
the Bottom-Up Principle is not able to give a viable answer to the Location Question in Minkowski 
spacetime. 
Principles  (4.3) – (4.5) are surely not the only possible No Overlap answers to the Location question. 
They seemed however the most promising ones. Thus, it is possible to conclude safely that the answer to 
(4.1), whatever that might be,  is an Overlap answer.21 The simplest of such answers is given by the Every 
Slice Principle: 
(4.6) (Every Slice Principle) Let x be a 3D object. Then x is exactly located at each and every 
achronal slice of Path (x) 
Note however that the following arguments of mine do not make use of the full force of (4.6). They 
depend just on the much weaker assumption of overlap among the exact locations of a 3D object. 
5  The Puzzle of Change 
In this section I will briefly rehearse the puzzle of change22 and the typical endurantist solutions to it. In a 
nutshell a solution to the puzzle of change  requires an explanation of how one and the same object can 
instantiate different incompatible properties. More in particular Kurtz and Haslanger (2006) argues that 
the following pre-analytical intuitions abut change are so firmly rooted that they seem not negotiable: 
(5.1) (Consistency) No material object x can have incompatible properties 
(5.2) (Change) Change involves incompatible properties 
And 
(5.3) (Persistence) Objects persist trough change 
Yet, they seem to entail a contradiction. The very same flower seems in fact to instantiate the 
incompatible properties of being in bloom and being withered. Three-dimensionalism solves the puzzle of 
change holding that spatiotemporal23 facts mediate somehow the instantiation of incompatible properties. 
This general strategy is implemented differently in different authors, for example in Mellor (1983), Van 
Inwagen (1990) and Hinchliff (1996). I do not want to enter the details of those applications here. The 
argument I am giving against these solutions  in the relativistic setting is rather general and it applies to 
all of them. So I will introduce the following notation 
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  It is probable for example that Gibson and Pooley (2006) maintains that there is no simple answer to the Location 
Question and that the true, very complex answer, is an Overlap Answer. 
22
  It is not my aim to give an exhaustive characterization of the puzzle. See Kurtz and Haslanger (2006) and 
references therein. 
23
  In the classic formulation of the arguments these are just temporal fact. However in spacetime physics time has 
to be modeled as an aspect of a more fundamental four-dimensional entity, namely spacetime. To consider 
seriously the spacetime conception of time I endorse what Sattig (2006) calls temporal supervenience. It is not 
possible to enter details here. As a rough approximation the thesis of temporal supervenience maintains that 
temporal facts do supervene on spatiotemporal facts. In other words, it is not possible to change temporal facts 
without changing spatiotemporal facts. For a much more detailed discussion see Sattig (2006). 
(5.10) (Property F at region R) F @ R1 (x) = object x has property F-at-region-R1 
Now, the instantiation of the incompatible properties is somehow modified by spatiotemporal facts and so 
no contradiction arises. In fact an object can instantiate both F @ R1 and not F @ R2, provided that R1 ≠ 
R2, without violating (5.1). That is, three-dimensionalist solutions to the puzzle of change imply that  
(5.11) (Three-dimensionalist Solutions) F @ R1 (x) ∧ ∼ F @ R2 (x) → R1 ≠ R2 
In the next section I will argue that this strategy is at best deeply problematic in Minkowski spacetime. 
6  The Relativistic Argument from Change 
Let x be a 3D object, and suppose that the following hold: 
(6.1) ExL (x,R1) 
(6.2) ExL (x,R2) 
(6.3) R1 ≠ R2 
(6.4) O (R1, R2) 
Note that they are all plausible assumptions: the first three stem directly from the definition of a 3D 
object, the last one is guaranteed by the location argument in section 4. Then: 
(6.5) (∃R) (R < R1 ∧ R < R2) 
Proof. It follows trivially from (6.4) and definition of Overlap from minimal mereology. But 
(6.6) R << R1 
Proof. R < R1 by (6.5). So, either R = R1 or R << R1. If R = R1 then R1 < R2  by substitution in (6.5) again. 
But R1 ≠ R2. It will follow that R1 << R2. But an object cannot be exactly located at a region and at one of 
its proper subregions without having changed its shape. And x did not. It will then follow that ~ 
ExL(x,R1), since ExL(x,R2). But this contradicts our assumptions. And 
(6.7) R << R2 
Proof. Just repeat the previous argument changing R1 and R2. 
Let me introduce two particular properties, namely being uniformly F and being uniformly not F.24  I will 
write  UnF (x) and Un ∼F (x) for x is uniformly F and x is uniformly not F respectively.  Let me give a 
more formal characterization of such properties. I say that an object x is uniformly F-at-R if it is F at 
every proper subregion of R. Since x overfills all subregions of its exact location, x is uniformly F  at Rx, 
where Rx is one of x’s exact locations, iff it is F at every subregion of Rx. Put more formally: 
(6.8) UnF @ Rx (x) = df (R << Rx) → F @ R (x)  
Assume now  
(6.9) UnF @ R1 (x) 
(6.10) Un∼F  @ R2 (x) 
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  Think for example to the following property, being uniformly red. 
These claims are supposedly grounded on the possibility of change. They say that x is uniformly F at R1 
and then it changes, say its color for example, to being uniformly not  F at R2. But now 
(6.11) UnF @ R1 (x) → F @ R (x) 
Proof. By definition (6.8) if x is uniformly F at R1 it is F simpliciter at every proper subregion of R1. But 
R is one of these proper subregions by (6.6). So (6.11) holds. Moreover, by the same argument 
(6.12) Un∼F @ R2 (x) → ∼ F @ R (x) 
But now we end up with 
(6.13) F@ R (x) 
Proof. By modus ponens, from (6.9) and (6.11), and 
(6.14) ∼ F @ R (x) 
Proof. By modus ponens, from (6.10) and (6.12). 
And this is terrible news for the endurantist. For we have seen in (5.5) that three-dimensionalist solutions 
to the puzzle of change entail that if x has incompatible properties then it has them at different spacetime 
regions. And this is not the case here, given (6.13) and (6.14). It follows that there are cases in a 
relativistic setting in which endurantist solutions to the puzzle of change do not work. Note that this 
argument crucially depends upon the geometric structure of Minkowski spacetime, in particular from the 
fact that the exact locations of a three-dimensional object do overlap each other. I now turn to a final 
discussion about different ways to resist the argument and to considerations about its extent. 
7  Conclusion 
Let me start by saying that, as it is the case with every philosophical argument, there are several ways to 
resist it. I will discuss some of them in order of increasing strength, or what struck me as increasing 
strength. Recently Rychter25 has argued that there is no puzzle of change after all. If this is the case then 
any purpose of any metaphysics of persistence is independent of its suitability to solve it. It is not possible 
to reply to such an argument here. If valid the argument in section 6 could be still read in conditional 
form. For the many three-dimensionalists that still hold that there is a certain puzzle in the vicinity of the 
one presented in section 5, the relativistic argument from change is still a threat. 
Another way is to point out that the argument presupposed implicitly that the spacetime subregions that 
are x's exact locations are ontologically on a par. While this is fairly uncontroversial in the case of space it 
is far less uncontroversial in the case of time. There is a famous metaphysics of time, namely Presentism, 
that exactly denies such a claim. There are two things to notice. The first one is the tenability of 
Presentism in a relativistic setting is very controversial. But never mind that. This is not really a reply on 
behalf of the three-dimensionalist after all. It is widely held that presentism per se constitute a possible 
solution to the puzzle of change. If you had presentism you would have not proposed the problematic 
solution of section 5 in the first place. The following replies are more to the point. 
Thus the problematic claims (6.13) and (6.14) do not hold. Again, two things can be said in reply. First of 
all, this commits the endurantist to a lot of metaphysical works on instantiation of properties. Second of 
all, suppose that a three-dimensionalist believe, as many do, in purely spatial parts. Then it could be 
argued that x has a proper part z that is exactly located at R and instantiate the incompatible properties F 
@ R and ∼ F @ R.  Thus the argument still stands. Naturally a three-dimensionalist that believe that 
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material objects are spatially extended simple would be unaffected by my argument. I grant that. However 
I do not believe that this was what any endurantist had originally in mind when formulating her 
metaphysics of persistence26.  
The most promising strategy seem to me the one proposed by Gilmore27. It is to claim that the case 
presented in section 6 is nothing like an ordinary case of change, given that R1 and R2 overlap. And so 
something more than the simple fact of the possibility of change is needed to ground the problematic 
claims (6.13) and (6.14). As far as I can see there are two possibilities here: either change in the case of 
overlapping regions is possible or it is not. If it is the latter then my argument is misdirected. If it is the 
former then my argument is a threat. But we do seem to have cases of change at overlapping regions in a 
relativistic context. After all that is all length contraction is all about, having different length at different 
overlapping spacetime regions.  
No doubt there are many other ways to resist the argument. However I will conclude pointing out two 
different things which cannot be fully addressed here. The first one is that the argument can be read not as 
a direct argument against 3D, but rather as a challenge for three-dimensionalists to come up with a 
different solutions for the puzzle of change that is suitable in Minkowski spacetime. When passing to a 
relativistic setting we did have to make all sorts of change and this one is maybe just one of them. The 
last one is that the argument can also be endorsed but three-dimensionalist. They will simply go on to 
argue that it does not cut simply against 3D but against every metaphysics of persistence, 4D included. I 
do not know whether this tu quoque argument is successful. But it seems to me to give raise to interesting 
questions. It raises the problem of instantiation of properties by four-dimensional objects. And this in 
turns calls into question the possibility of drawing an unappreciated distinction between locational 
persistence and mereological persistence, or so I believe. These are all serious questions, and they'll have 
to wait for another time. 
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